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Mistake In Boundary Disputes

Tamburo v. Miller'
Ervin v. Brown?
Hub Bel Air, Inc. v. Hirsch'
Bishop v. Stackus4
Ridgely v. Lewis5
The courts of this country have long been in conflict on
the question of whether there can be an adverse possession
where the adverse possessor has occupied beyond his boundary line as the result of a mistake in the location of that
boundary. The five cases presently noted, which were decided recently by the Court of Appeals, have clarified Maryland's stand in this conflict.
In Tamburo v. Miller, the plaintiff had brought suit in
trespass q.c.f for that the defendant adjoining lot owner
had occupied ground beyond the confines of his deed onto
the property of the plaintiff. The defendant, when he originally purchased his lot, had erected a fence around his
property connecting wooden pegs which he had erroneously
thought to signify his boundaries; and he had later built a
boat-house partially on the property of the defendant. The
argument raised by the defendant, both as a defense and as
the ground for a counter claim in trespass, was that he
(defendant) had gained title by an adverse possession for
the twenty year period of the statute of limitations. The
plaintiff, in turn, contended that since the defendant had
occupied beyond his boundary as the result of a mistake,
there was not such an adverse possession to have ever
started the statute running. The Court of Appeals held that
the mistake was immaterial, and that the adverse occupation for the twenty year period had vested title in the defendant. In the words of the Court:
"The modern trend and the better rule is that where
the visible boundaries have existed for the period set
forth in the statute of limitations, title will vest in the
adverse possessor where there is evidence of unequivocal acts of ownership. In this view it is immaterial
that the holder supposed the visible boundary to be
correct or, in other words, the fact that the possession
1203 Md. 329, 100 A.

2d 818 (1953).
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was due to inadvertence, ignorance, or mistake, is entirely immaterial."'
In Ervin v. Brown, the doctrine was followed, the only
substantial difference in the case being that there the disseisor occupied up to a hedge planted by the disseisee rather
than himself. The Court held that there being evidence
justifying a finding of adverse possession, it was immaterial that it arose from a mistake.7
The same question was raised as to a small strip of
ground between two buildings in Hub Bel Air, Inc. v.
Hirsch, supra. The Court, regarding the question as now
being settled, disposed of it by saying that the argument
was answered by the Tamburo case.' By holding the mistake to be immaterial in these cases, the Maryland Court
has repudiated the view which considers the mistake a
weighty factor in determining if there is a sufficient intent
to constitute an adverse possession.
Though having been criticized for the commission of an
historical error,' the courts in this country had long been
uniform in holding that two of the essential elements of an
adverse possession are that the occupation be with a hostile
'Tamburo v. Miller, supra,n. 1, 336.
Ervin v. Brown, supra,n. 2, 143, 144.
'Hub Bel Air, Inc. v. Hirsch, 8upra, n. 3, 645.
OBordwell, Mistake and Adverse Possession, 7 Iowa L. Bull. 129 (1922).
The author argues that the American conception of adverse possession has
been from the affirmative approach of the party in possession being vested
with a new title rather than the English negative approach of limitations
running against the old title of the party out of possession. This, he says,
is the result of confusing adverse po8session with the common law conception of di8seisin, which, when repudiated by Lord Mansfield in the case
of Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60, 97 Eng. Rep. 190 (1757), gave rise to the
modern concept of adverse possession. The American error resulted from
the:
identification of adverse possession with the old disseisin and a
reading Into adverse possession of Coke's old definition of a disseisin
(Co. Lit. 153b) to the effect that 'a disseisin is when one enters, intending to usurp the possession, and to oust another of his freehold'."
This led to the unfortunate "impression that in order for title to he gained
by adverse possession the land must be held with an intent consciously
hostile to the true owner", Bordwell, ibid, 132, circa, fn. 21. See also articles
by the same author in 34 Harv. L. Rev. 592 and 717 (1921) and 33 Yale
L. J. 1 (1923) ; and City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 Pac.
908 (1929).
A possible manifestation of this may lie in the fact that as a matter of
pleading, the statute of limitations for adverse possession may be raised
under the general issue plea in Maryland, whereas it must otherwise be
specially pleaded. 1 PoE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (5th ed., 1925), Sec. 275;
Md. Code (1951), Art. 75, Sec. 76; Hub Bel Air, Inc. v. Hirsch, supra, n. 3,
641-642. The inference may be that the defendant's showing limitations and
title In himself is denial of the plaintiff's allegation of title or possession,
whereas a plea of limitations In other cases Is merely an allegation that an
otherwise valid cause of action is barred by lapse of time.
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intent, and under a claim of right or title. ° Thus, the
general rule is that:
"... to constitute an actual disseisin, there must
not only be an unlawful entry.., but it must be made
with an intention to dispossess the owner,... Thus...
the quo animo, in which the possession was taken, is
a test of its adverse character; and before one's possession is pronounced adverse, it must be found that he
intended to hold in hostility to the true owner.""
In applying this principle to the mistake cases, many courts
reasoned that where one had occupied beyond his boundary
through a mere inadvertence, there was lacking the necessary hostile intent to claim against the true owner. Mistake
and hostile intent were said to be mutually exclusive of
one another; 12 "the mere fact that the occupation is by pure
mistake precluding any possibility of there being a possession hostile to . . . a consciously considered individual". 13
However, this in itself did not entirely preclude the
possibility of an adverse possession in the majority of courts
following this view, for a further distinction was drawn
from which could yet be found a hostile intent. This distinction was whether the mistaken possession was under a
conditional intent to claim title to the boundary occupied,
or under an absolute intent to do so; that is, whether the
intent was to claim only if the mistakenly-chosen boundary
was the correct line, or whether the intent was to claim
regardless of its being the true line. If the latter, the
possession was adverse; if the former, it was not. 4 Washburn described the distinction thusly:
"'... . if the limits of the occupation be fixed with
the intention of claiming them as the boundaries, the
statute runs; but if the occupation and delimitation of
the boundaries appear to be merely provisional, with
10Bordwell, 8upra, n. 9, 130-1; Tamburo v. Miller, supra, n. 1, 335; Bishop
v. Stackus, 8upra, n. 4, 498.
n3 WASHBUnN, REA PRoPi"r (5th ed., 1887) 139, and to the same effect
at 149:
... this intent to claim and possess the land is one of the qualities
essential to constitute a disseisin."
"The argument putting relevance on the mistake is:
"... that to make the possession adverse and constitute an ouster
there must be an intent to disseise the owner, and that the belief that
they owned to the line to which they occupied negatives such an intent,
and their occupation will 'therefore be presumed to be in subordination
to the title of the true owner."
Searles v. De Ladson, 81 Conn. 133, 70 A. 589, 590 (1908).
18Comment, 31 Yale L. J. 195, 196 (1921).
"4 TIFFANY, REAL. PROPERTY (3rd ed., 1939), 471-2.
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the intent to claim them as boundaries if they are found
to be the proper boundaries, then the statute does not
run'.'"15
This view - repudiated first in the Tamburo case - was
the view which had been followed by the early Maryland
0
cases. In Cresap v. Hutson,"
it was said that where two
brothers had erroneously approximated the boundary between the portions of a tract devised to each by their father,
the mistake prevented an adverse possession by the one
who was occupying beyond his true line. And in Davis v.
Furlow," the Court of Appeals upheld a prayer granted by
the lower court that if the defendant's predecessor had
occupied the land, supposing it to be the land in the deed,
and without the intent to occupy land outside the lines of
the deed, then it did not constitute an adverse possession.
The Court said:
"'A disseisin cannot be committed by mistake, because the intention of the possessor to claim adversely
is an essential ingredient of a disseisin'."'
In Sadtler v. Peabody Heights Co., 9 the defendant in
ejectment was held to have acquired title to a closed roadbed between two of his lots, even though he occupied under
the mere belief that it was his, because he had taken possession with the hostile intent to claim it whether it was
really his or not. In Jacobs v. Disharoon,0 the plaintiff had
purchased a portion of a large tract and occupied the land
according to the boundaries marked on the ground by a
surveyor in the presence of the grantor and the plaintiff.
In the deed, instead of describing the plot as so marked on
the ground, the grantor erroneously described boundaries
the parties had earlier discussed but discarded. The Court,
after discussing the distinction between conditional and
absolute intent in mistake cases, 2 held that this plaintiff
had the necessary hostile intent to claim the land for
which he had paid.22
mAs quoted in Jacobs v. Disharoon, 113 Md. 92, 98, 77 A. 258 (1910). See
also Tamburo v. Miller, 203 Md. 329, 336, 100 A. 2d 818 (1953) ; Ervin v.
Brown, 204 Md. 136, 143-4, 102 A. 2d 806 (1954).
9 Gill 269 (Md., 1850).
" 27 Md. 536 (1867).
"Ibid, 545.
" 66 Md. 1, 10 A. 599 (1886).
Supra, n. 15.
mAs appears in the quotation, ibid, 98.
2In
the Tamburo case, supra, n. 15, at 336, the Court seemed to rely on
Jacobs v. Disharoon as authority for the view 'that the mistake is Immaterial, when it states the holding in that case to have been:
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Criticism of the old view has been levelled at its practical result, in that it rewards only the evil intent. Though
the law seldom allows a man to profit by his own mistake to
the detriment of another, by excluding mistaken possession
from the doctrine of adverse possession, that doctrine thereby limits its protection to the thief who would "steal" the
land of his neighbor with a "felonious" intent.2 8 It has also
been said that the old view's emphasis on the mental attitude of the possessor is unwarranted, for it is the running
of limitations against the true owner's action in ejectment
which is the important factor.24 But even assuming that
the intent element is an important factor to be considered for the courts uniformly require some hostile intent to
claim against the true owner - the analysis of the courts
following the old view is fraught with theoretical inconsistencies, and impracticalities of evidence and proof.
By searching the evidence to determine if the occupier's
intent was conditional or absolute, the courts adhering to
the old view disregard the rule that a man's intent should
be determined by his objective manifestations rather than
his subjective thoughts. Here the objective intent appears
from the very act of possession and the degree and character thereof. As Justice Holmes, speaking for the Massachusetts Court, said:
".... he will not be the less a disseisor ...because
his occupation . . . is under the belief that it is embraced in his deed. His claim is not limited by his
".. that one who continuously asserts ownership within an enclosure
for more than twenty years in exclusive, notorious and actual hostile
possession, would not be required to surrender the title by adverse
possession merely because of his possession by mistake."
This would appear to be an improper reliance. Not only did the Court in
the Jacobs case rationalize the problem under the old view of materiality
of mistake and "alternative intent", but also the case is not the traditional
situation of the mistake case: it was not so much a mistake in possession
as a mistake in the deed, for which equity may accord reformation. The
Court in the Jacobs case, supra, n. 15, 98, evidently was influenced by such
nature of the mistake, for it said:
... to hold that one who purchases... and continues for ..
twenty
years, in . . . hostile . . . possession . . . asserting his claim to it .. ,
must surrender it because of some defect in his deed would largely do
away with title by adverse possession." (Italics supplied.)
2580 A. L. R. 157; 97 A. L. R. 14, 20-21. The latter annotation contains a
voluminous collection of cases of both -the old and new views. See also City
of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908 (1929) ; and Bordwell,
Mistake and Adverse Possession,7 Iowa L. Bull. 129 (1922).
213 AMERICAN LAW OF PaOPERTY (1952), 789. The author criticizes the
authorities following the old view because:
"They are necessarily wrong as a matter of legal principle because
they disregard the plain operation of the statute of limitations which
alone gives -title by adverse possession."
See also Bordwell, ibid.
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belief. Or, to put it in another way, the direction of
the claim to an object identified by the senses as the
thing claimed overrides the inconsistent attempt to
direct it also in conformity to the deed, just as a similar
identification, when a pistol shot is fired or a conveyance is made, overrides the inconsistent belief that
the
'25
person aimed at or the grantee is some one else.
Not only does such a rule depart from the tests applied in
other fields of law,2" but the question of whether there was
a mere conditional intent to possess to the true boundary
is difficult and often insusceptible of proof. In the early
2 7 the Connectiand well reasoned case of French v. Pearce,
cut Court criticized the adoption of this rule, pointing out:
"The enquiry no longer is, whether visible possession, with the intent to possess,... is a disseisin; but
from this plain and easy standard of proof we are to
depart, and the invisible motives of the mind are to
be explored."2
Perhaps it is too lenient to say that conditional or unconditional intent is "insusceptible of proof". For in actuality, one who possesses land beyond his boundary under
the mistake that it is his own can have but one intent. He
holds it as he holds the land contained in his deed, intending to claim it against all the world, for he is unaware of
any difference in the two. Since he labors under mistake
and ignorance, he does not conceive of the possibility that
it may not be his. The thought never enters his mind of
whether he claims the land only upon its being the true
boundary. "He has no positive or conscious intention, one
way or the other. ' 29 Hence, the attempt to prove which
0 Bond v. O'Gara, 177 Mass. 139, 58 N. E. 275, 276 (1900). (Italics
supplied.)
Tiffany points out that even in other phases of the law of adverse
possession, the intent factor Is not so applied. Why should more weight be
given the mistake in boundary cases than where the mistake goes to the
title to a whole tract? 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed., 1939) 475,
fn. 56. The author cites the following from 2 DEMBiTz, LAND TITLES, 1937:
"If possession through mistake were held not to be adverse, very
little room would be left for the statute of limitations, for almost every
man who buys land under a bad title labors under the mistaken idea
that his deed is good and effectual."
8 Conn. 439 (1831).
2 Ibid, 445. (Italics supplied.)
97 A. L. R. 14, 20. And in City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, supra, n. 23,
913, it was said:
"Not knowing of the mistake, an intent to correct the line ... when
the true boundary is . . . discovered is hardly conceivable . . . So far
as any mistake is concerned, -thatis not likely to enter his mind. What-

1957]

TAMBURO v. MILLER

-

ET AL.

of the two intentions he had is merely a hypothetical question in retrospect: what30would his intent have been had
he known of his mitake?
Such speculation raises a further objection in that it encourages fabricated testimony and puts the honest and uncoached party-witness at a disadvantage. Given the choice
on the witness stand, between two intentions of which he
had neither, he is likely to select the "morally better" one,
that he merely intended to occupy to the boundary if it
were the correct line, and thereby defeat his case.
A learned writer, in discussing these problems, has
argued that the analytical error committed by the courts
which follow the old view has been the failure to distinguish
two different situations: (1) a pure mistake and (2) a conscious doubt.3 In the latter, conscious doubt, the individual
who oversteps his boundary has a conscious uncertainty
of the exact line; therefore, he is aware that he may commit
error. In such a situation, he will have either a conditional
intention or an absolute one, and, hence, it is proper to
determine which of the two he in fact had. But in the case
of pure mistake - the situation in the majority of the
cases - there is no possibility of such an alternative, because he is unaware that he has overstepped his line.
It is hoped that the Maryland Court, in repudiating the
older view in the mistake cases, will nevertheless distinguish it from the conscious doubt situation. The quarrel
with the old view of the mistake cases is that they sought
to distinguish between two types of intent where there
could be only one possible intention. But in the conscious
doubt cases, where the intent could be conditional or absolute, a failure to so distinguish would be as unfair to the
disseisee as the old mistake view was to the disseisor.
Thus it would seem that although the Maryland Court
failed to utilize an opportunity to distinguish conscious
doubt from pure mistake in Bishop v. Stackus,' 2 there is
ever affirmative psychological attitude he may be said to have Is an
intent to claim the land, though not from anyone else, since he already
considers it his own."
10In Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Ida. 286, 105 P. 1066, 1068 (1909), the
Court said:
"Neither the courts nor anyone else can tell or conjecture what the
party might have intended to do in the event he discovered later that
he had been mistaken as to the true line. If he acted in ignorance of
the 'true line and in good faith, then of course he could have had no
intention whatever with reference to a possible future discovery of any
mistake. So far as he was then concerned, he was acting on a verity."
81
Note, 7 Ore. L. Rev. 329, 331 et seq. (1928).
206 Md. 493, 112 A. 2d 472 (1955). In that case there was evidence from
which it might have been found that the possession was under a conscious
doubt accompanied by a conditional intent. Evidence Inferring conscious

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVII

reason to believe that it may yet be done; the Court's language in several instances so indicates. In Ervin v. Brown,
the Court said: "The occupation by the appellees' decedent
could not be considered to be provisional."8 And in Ridgely
v. Lewis, " the Court said that, "... certainly, in the instant
case, there is to be found that there was nothing provisional in the holding and use of Parcel A."8 5
In as much as these statements were contained in two of
the very cases repudiating the distinction between conditional and absolute intent in mistake cases, it is submitted
that the only logical reason for which the statements could
have been made is that the Court visualized situations in
which there could be one of two types of intent, such situations being those of conscious doubt.
LEwis

A. KANN*

Boulevard Law Extended
Shriner v. Mullhausen1
At 11 A.M. on January 5, 1953, Mrs. Pauline M. Shriner
was driving an automobile owned by her husband, Mr.
Marlin L. Shriner, east along a hard paved, public highway.
Evidence was conflicting as to the speed at which she was
driving. The weather was clear and the road was dry. As
she drove over the crest of a hill she saw ahead a tractor
with a manure spreader attached, blocking the highway.
The entire piece of equipment measured twenty-three feet
eleven inches in length and weighed approximately 7,200
pounds. The equipment had just entered the highway from
a private dirt driveway belonging to Mr. Joseph H. Mullhausen. The equipment also belonged to Mr. Mullhausen
and his son was at the wheel. The two vehicles collided at
the intersection.
Mrs. Shriner brought suit against both Mullhausens in
the Circuit Court of Carroll County for personal injuries
doubt included discussions by the disseisor's wife with the builder that the
garage may have been over the boundary, and similar statements made
to the disselsee. Evidence of conditional intent appeared from statements

in regard to moving the garage off of the disseisee's property.

" 204 Md. 136, 144, 102 A. 2d 806 (1954).
9 204 Md. 56, 105 A. 2d 212 (1953) - another case reiterating the doc-

trine of the Tamburo case.

MIbid, 567.
Class of 1956, University of Maryland School of Law.
'210 Md. 104, 122 A. 2d 570 (1956).

